The Limits of Russian Loyalty
The real threat to the Kremlin is not an open coup, but a quiet hesitation when direct orders are issued.
After Russia’s assault on Kyiv collapsed, senior commanders under Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov refused an urgent Kremlin order to reinforce Mariupol, forcing Viktor Zolotov to threaten them with desertion charges before they moved, according to reporting in the Russian-language press. Mariupol was central to Russia’s land corridor across occupied southern Ukraine and offered Moscow a desperately needed victory after its humiliation around Kyiv. As Putin’s former bodyguard and director of the Russian National Guard, Zolotov formally commanded the institution containing many of these Chechen formations.
Even one of Putin’s top men could secure obedience only by threatening officers inside his own organization with prosecution.
"The awkward embrace of a dictator realizing his rented loyalty is about to get repossessed."
This confrontation exposed a weakness Putin deliberately built into the Russian state after the Second Chechen War. Following the 1999 apartment bombings, which Moscow blamed on Chechen terrorists, Putin launched a campaign promising to restore federal control over Chechnya. Rather than remain with the Chechen independence movement, Ramzan’s father, Akhmad Kadyrov, switched sides and backed the Kremlin. Putin rewarded that defection with federal subsidies, political protection, and broad freedom to govern through a family-controlled security system. Stability returned, but Moscow surrendered direct control over much of the armed power maintaining it.
When a state's supreme security chief must resort to criminal threats just to get his own men to the starting line, it becomes clear that Putin did not conquer Chechnya; he merely leased its loyalty.