China Subordinates Russia at Tianjin: End of Multipolar Myth
How Beijing is exploiting energy, tech, and espionage to dismantle Russian power—and why Ukraine, Taiwan, and NATO must respond immediately
At the July 2025 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Tianjin—a regional security and political forum originally created to balance Western influence in Eurasia—Sergei Lavrov delivered Vladimir Putin’s letter to Xi Jinping. But this was not a gesture of diplomacy. It was a symbolic act of submission. Moscow arrived not as a peer, but as a petitioner—pleading for economic relief, strategic relevance, and geopolitical survival. Beijing made the rules, and Russia nodded along.
Lavrov meets Xi—Moscow's diplomatic “pivot” now looks more like a kneel. The Russian Foreign Minister’s meeting with the Chinese dictator, Xi Jinping, is getting a lot of attention.
That letter, Kremlin insiders now confirm, wasn’t mere protocol. It was a strategic request ahead of Putin’s scheduled September visit—a quiet appeal for energy pricing guarantees, defense technology, and pipeline progress from Xi’s inner circle. This was not negotiation. It was petitioning for mercy and favor from a superior.¹
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Evidence of that could be seen behind the photo ops, where Russia’s security services saw something else entirely. A leaked internal FSB report ranked China among Russia’s top three espionage threats—surpassing even the United States.² The memo warned that so-called military and technological exchanges are serving Chinese intelligence far more than they benefit the Russian war machine.³ Lavrov’s public declarations of “mutual support” were merely for cover. The real direction of power was unambiguous, and it flowed from Beijing outward.⁴
History has shown this pattern before. The 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk forced Russia to retreat from its Pacific frontier under Chinese pressure. The brief Sino-Soviet alliance of the 1950s ended in open hostility, culminating in a near-nuclear clash on Damansky Island in 1969.⁵ Russia enters partnerships with China believing it has found a strategic partner. But again and again, it finds itself sidelined, humiliated, and eventually eclipsed.
Sarah C. M. Paine—University Professor of History and Grand Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College—warns bluntly that Xi Jinping is strategically waiting for Vladimir Putin’s Russia to reach its lowest point before asserting dominance: “The question isn't if China will turn on Russia, but when.”¹ She references a long history of conflict, from imperial border disputes to 20th‑century clashes, arguing that Beijing’s current patience mirrors centuries of Sino‑Russian warfare and rivalry. Instead of genuine alliance, Paine sees Moscow serving as a transient partner—useful now, disposable later—when gravity shifts in China’s favor and Russian weakness leaves Putin vulnerable.
Today, the battleground is technological. Russia shares hypersonic missile data. China reverse-engineers it. Moscow hosts drone-warfare exchanges. China adapts and dominates. This is not a partnership. It is asymmetrical extraction—a slow strategic bleed. Parasitism.
China’s "copy-and-replace" doctrine is no secret. The Chengdu J-20 stealth fighter integrates design elements from the American F-22 and F-35 with the distinct contours of Russia’s experimental MiG-1.44—reconstructed using hundreds of thousands of stolen files. If Moscow believes it is guiding Beijing’s military development, then it is not leading—it is being replaced.⁶
Even space reflects this subordination. Under the planned 2035 International Lunar Research Station, Russia will be relegated to supplying nuclear energy modules. China will retain full control over design, launch, operations, and scientific objectives. Russia helped build the mission, but China will command it. There will be no joint flag on the moon.
Energy infrastructure reveals another layer of dependence. The Power of Siberia 2 pipeline—projected to deliver 50 billion cubic meters annually through Mongolia—remains stalled. Beijing demands bottom-barrel gas prices and long-term equity control. Moscow, desperate for revenue to continue its war in Ukraine, will have no choice but to comply when Putin arrives in September.¹
Meanwhile, Beijing has already begun cutting Russia out of its former sphere of influence. In June 2025, China signed multibillion-dollar energy and infrastructure deals with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—without so much as inviting Russian ministers to observe.⁷ The Belt and Road Initiative has reoriented. Mandarin is replacing Russian in Central Asian schools. Chinese railways are now replacing Russian routes. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization is disintegrating: Iran exploits the bloc to expand its sanctioned drone market, while India has refused to endorse any Iran-leaning communiqués.⁸
East Asia is no less alarmed. Japan’s 2025 Defense White Paper names the China–Russia axis as the greatest threat since World War II. In response, Chinese and Russian bombers probing Japanese airspace have triggered the reactivation of missile batteries and tighter trilateral defense coordination with the United States and Australia. NATO, silently and without fanfare, is recalibrating its own nuclear posture.
We still don’t have the full text of Putin’s letter. But we don’t need it. The moment Lavrov handed it over in Tianjin, the message was clear. Russia is no longer a leader in Eurasia—it is a subordinate power seeking survival in Beijing’s shadow. What the Kremlin asked for—energy relief, technology guarantees, pipeline concessions—paled in comparison to what it gave away: its strategic sovereignty.
Moscow sought multipolarity, but Beijing offered only vassalage. Through espionage, economic leverage, space marginalization, and regional isolation, China is not just partnering with Russia—it is absorbing it. The consequences are global. Ukraine must strike now, before this axis hardens. Taiwan must act with urgency to shore up its defenses. NATO must rethink its deterrence map and adapt to a new world in which Beijing’s nuclear partnership with Moscow reshapes Eurasian risk. Space policy must adjust to an orbital future dominated by Chinese-controlled infrastructure—built in part by Russia, but owned by Beijing. Moscow demanded multipolarity—but woke up having signed away its sovereignty.
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Jason Jay Smart, also known as Jason Smart and Jason J Smart, is a political adviser who has lived and worked in Ukraine, Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Latin America. In 2010, he was banned for life by the Kremlin for supporting Russia’s democratic opposition to Vladimir Putin.
Footnotes
Reuters, “Gazprom, CNPC discuss future Russian gas supplies to China,” July 11, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/gazprom-cnpc-discuss-future-russian-gas-supplies-to-china-2025-07-11/
Pratidin Time, “Leaked FSB Report Labels China as Espionage Threat to Russia,” June 9, 2025, https://www.pratidintime.com/world/leaked-fsb-report-labels-china-as-espionage-threat-to-russia-9346789
Economic Times India, “‘China is the enemy’: Leaked Russian intel document reveals Kremlin’s actual view of Beijing,” June 8, 2025, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-is-the-enemy-leaked-russian-intel-document-reveals-kremlins-actual-view-of-beijing-accuses-it-of-espionage/articleshow/121727671.cms
TASS, “Lavrov: Relations with China Have Reached an Unprecedented Level,” April 1, 2025, https://tass.com/politics/1937047
Wikipedia, “Sino-Soviet border conflict,” accessed July 2025, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sino-Soviet_border_conflict
Lansing Institute, “Bear Meets Dragon: The Escalating Espionage Rivalry Between Russia and China,” June 9, 2025, https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/06/09/bear-meets-dragon-the-escalating-espionage-rivalry-between-russia-and-china/
Reuters, “China signs energy mineral deals with Central Asia,” June 17, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/china-signs-energy-mineral-deals-central-asia-2025-06-17/
Reuters, “Iran uses SCO to sell drones,” July 15, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-uses-sco-circumvent-sanctions-drone-sales-2025-07-15/
Reuters, “India abstains SCO declaration Iran–Israel,” July 15, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/india-abstains-sco-declaration-iran-israel-2025-07-15/
It was obvious, to me anyway, as soon as Putin signed up to their "friendship without limits" that Russia would be the junior partner.
About two years ago, I made a comment on a pro-Russia page - maybe Dugin’s Arktos Press page - that China was supplying enough to keep Russia “in the fight” but not win - in order to attrit Russia’s military strength. Russia’s Siberian oil plays are on tertiary extraction - hydrofracturing - there, and have been since before 2022. That’s why Putin, with his PhD in Natural Resource Economics (1997) wants Ukraine and especially Crimea and the southern Oblasts so bad - warm water ports at Sevastopol and Feodosia, easily made into loading terminals, places for refineries and storage nearby, with what looks like lots of exploratory drilling into extensive Black Sea oil formations - Turkey has been doing a lot of work in this area as well - I wrote about this in April or May of 2022. If China marched into the Far East, especially Kamchatka - they already have more than a million dual citizenship nationals there - like they did in 1969, there’s not a hell of a lot that Vladimir Vladimirovich could do about it, with the current Russian Army. In 1969, the Russian Army booted the PLA out in six months, but after systematically destroying the Russian Army in Ukraine, Vlad would be well and truly screwed if Xi did the same. I think Xi knows it and is biding his time, and certain of Putin’s siloviki know it - and maybe Putin knows it, if his delusions haven’t taken over - that would explain the Crimea obsession. Interesting times…