Solovyov’s hardest job yet: explaining why gaining 1 km² a day is actually a strategic masterpiece.

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The Polish authorities launched an investigation after the incident (Photo: PAP/Wojtek Jargiło).

Consider the real-world consequences of that missile in a field: Poland must now decide whether additional Patriot batteries, radar systems, and interceptors should go to Ukraine or remain at home. Every system Poland retains is one fewer protecting Ukrainian cities, power stations, military facilities, and frontline troops. Putin does not need to defeat NATO for this strategy to work. He only needs NATO to hesitate.

Skeptical Moscow would take such a gamble? Precedent says otherwise. Russian drones, missiles, and fighters routinely breach NATO airspace. Earlier incursions into Poland yielded only disputed explanations, delayed investigations, and desperate de-escalation. The Kremlin learned it can cross the border, alarm Warsaw, and face zero military fallout.

Russia nees some kind of a game changer - a paradigm shift - quickly: Their “three-day special military operation” has now passed 1,621 days and Ukraine is forcing Russia to defend itself, full-court, across 11 time zones: Moscow, occupied Crimea, oil refineries, airfields, defense plants, and logistics hubs are competing for the same limited supply of launchers, radars, crews, and interceptors. Protecting one target leaves another easier to strike. Russia now wants European governments to face the same choice.

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Ukraine’s recent strikes on Wildberries show why Moscow needs NATO distracted. The company processes 52% of Russia’s online orders for roughly 800,000 businesses, while also serving as an informal military quartermaster supplying troops with body armor, radios, drone components, and other equipment that state procurement fails to deliver. Strikes on 12 facilities have destroyed about 10% of its warehouse capacity, threatening a company already carrying nearly $1 billion in debt and spreading losses through merchants, borrowers, and banks. Wildberries is now seeking approximately 100,000 square meters (1.1 million square feet) of replacement space in Kazakhstan, forcing a critical wartime supply network across another border and adding customs delays, higher transport costs, and less Kremlin control.

Ukraine forced Putin into a brutal triage of his own airspace: decide what gets protected and what gets left to burn. The missile over Poland was Moscow’s attempt to export that same paralysis to NATO. It was not fired to provoke a war with Warsaw. It was fired to make Europe disarm Ukraine through its own fear.

Like a bad cold: He is remarkably hard to get rid of.

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Evidence of this shift is visible across Russia’s business elite, where roughly 1-in-10 Forbes-listed Russians have reportedly faced asset seizures, forced transfers, or comparable pressure since 2022. Domodedovo Airport showed that even strategic assets can be confiscated once their owners lose political protection. Wildberries exposed the same rule through political intervention, an ownership struggle, physical violence, and commercial disruption surrounding one of Russia’s largest private companies. In Putin’s Russia, ownership survives only while political protection does.

Financial pressure is spreading beyond individual oligarchs because Moscow must manufacture domestic buyers for the debt financing its war. As private investors demand terms the government considers unacceptable, the Kremlin must lean more heavily on state-controlled banks, major corporations, and institutions that cannot safely refuse. Sberbank’s warning about limited liquidity therefore reveals more than a banking problem: Putin is exhausting the financial system required to sustain government borrowing. Once voluntary financing weakens, coercion becomes the financing model.

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The regime’s remaining options include tighter foreign-currency controls, pressure on private deposits, compulsory bond purchases, higher corporate levies, and deeper raids on regional budgets. Every emergency levy transfers another portion of the war’s cost onto the elites whose loyalty was purchased with stability and profit.

Political warning signs are also surfacing inside institutions deliberately constructed to suppress disagreement and project total unity. When Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov invoked a possible “1917 scenario” in the State Duma, his language was striking because parliament normally functions as a controlled instrument of Kremlin authority.

Within such a system, public references to revolution suggest that fear is spreading upward through the hierarchy. Today, we see it is becoming rampant.

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Putin’s growing isolation may intensify the danger because a ruler receiving filtered intelligence becomes easier for rival factions to manipulate. This information vacuum traps powerful insiders in a prisoner’s dilemma: each must display loyalty while privately assessing escape routes, alliances, and succession scenarios. Acting too early could bring imprisonment or death, while waiting too long could mean losing wealth, freedom, and influence.

None of this means Russia’s ruling elite are embracing democracy or developing moral objections to the war. Rather, they may reach a colder conclusion:

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In June 2026, Russian forces seized roughly 30 km² (12 mi²) of Ukrainian territory. Securing that ground cost Moscow:
- 40,000 personnel casualties.
- $19 billion in military expenditures and strike-induced economic damage.

That works out to over 1,300 casualties and $633 million per km² gained (3,400 casualties and $1.6 billion per mi²). More importantly, though Russia captured territory, it brought Moscow no closer to its political objectives. Territory itself has no intrinsic value unless: The question is whether it helps to achieve the state’s political objectives.

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Moscow’s principal war aims were never the marginal acquisition of Ukrainian borderlands. They were:
- Subordinating the Ukrainian state to Moscow’s political control.
- Eliminating Ukraine’s independent military capability.
- Replacing Kyiv’s sovereign government with a compliant regime.
- Severing Ukraine’s integration with the West.
- Imposing constitutional and territorial terms dictated by the Kremlin.

1,620 days into the war, Ukraine remains:
- Sovereign.
- Heavily armed.
- Politically independent.
- Institutionally intact.
- Capable of sustained military resistance.
- Structurally integrated into the Western security system.

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The strategic paradox for Moscow is absolute. Vladimir Putin sought to disarm Ukraine; instead, he created one of Europe’s largest, most technologically capable, and battle-hardened militaries. He sought to halt Western expansion; instead, he accelerated Ukraine’s permanent economic, political, and military integration into the Euro-Atlantic architecture. He sought to prove that Ukrainian resistance was futile; instead, Ukraine has sustained years of high-intensity warfare, built an advanced domestic defense sector, and routinely strikes deep within Russian territory.

The “Masster Strategist’s” three-day Special Military Operation is on Day 1,620.

However, the capacity to inflict destruction is not the capacity to force political submission. Strategic assessment demands a clear distinction between structural capacity, local battlefield momentum, and political outcome. Russia possesses capacity and marginal momentum, but it has repeatedly failed to convert either into Ukrainian capitulation.

Wars of attrition are not won merely by inflicting losses; they are won by sustaining a favorable balance of strategic capital. A state that burns through finite military, economic, and political reserves faster than its territorial gains improve its bargaining position is not advancing toward victory; Rather, it is accelerating its own degradation.

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It doesn’t seem that the Russians’ taking of territory is going so well.

June 2026 illustrates this structural failure. Moscow paid a ruinous price for geographically trivial gains that failed to sever critical supply lines, trigger an operational collapse, or force a single political concession from Kyiv.

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Tactical progress frequently coexists with strategic failure. Military history is replete with armies that advanced, occupied ground, and inflicted heavy casualties right up until the collapse of their strategic position.

Map movement is battlefield activity, not strategic progress. Selected Russian units may continue to advance, but holding ruined ground while failing to break an adversary’s political resolve is not victory.

Ukraine’s strikes raise the cost of war by destroying facilities like Wildberries, while Kremlin seizures force domestic wealth to flee right when Moscow needs it most.

With Central Bank interest rates at 14%, domestic borrowing is painfully expensive. [4] Russian businesses face rising wartime costs right when they desperately need capital to replace broken machinery. Instead of staying home to rebuild, wealth is escaping.

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Capital is running away because private property inside Russia is no longer secure: During the first three years of the full-scale war, the Kremlin seized roughly $50 billion in assets from domestic businesses and foreign corporations. [6][7] A study by the Moscow law firm Nektorov, Saveliev and Partners calculated that recent Russian government seizures of private assets match nearly 15 years of incoming foreign investment, based on 2024 rates of $3.35 billion. [6][8][9]

Russian banking data shows corporate lending growth dropped from 1.5% in May to just 0.4% in June as corporate deposits stalled and household savings flatlined despite high interest rates. Though banks remain profitable, this sharp slowdown in domestic funding signals a deepening squeeze while an even bigger crisis goes untreated. [12]

Every damaged refinery and warehouse forces Russia to spend capital it cannot spare: Rebuilding takes immediate funding, yet steep interest rates make borrowing painful and state seizures leave owners terrified to fund assets they might lose tomorrow. [4][6][7][10] And herein lies the rub of Ukraine’s strategy: Every strike increases Russia’s demand for capital, while every Kremlin seizure destroys the incentive for private investors to supply it.[4][5][6][10]

Seizing private businesses gives Moscow quick control, but it warns every remaining owner to move their wealth abroad. Cash stashed overseas cannot fund domestic factories, commercial loans, or critical infrastructure. Capital flees right when the war demands it most. [5][10][11]

Moscow can patch refinery pipes, rebuild warehouses, or hand stolen companies to loyal insiders. It cannot rebuild trust. Ukraine is raising the physical cost of war inside Russia, while Putin’s own policies destroy the willingness to fund it.

Footnotes:

1. Associated Press, “Ukraine says it hit a major Russian oil refinery, hours after Zelenskyy’s meeting with Trump,” July 29, 2026:
   https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-oil-refinery-trump-zelenskyy-4275c2280107aedba37df8704f226ce6

2. Reuters, “Widening Ukrainian attacks on Russian online retailer Wildberries shutter another warehouse,” July 23, 2026:
   https://live.euronext.com/en/financial-news/widening-ukrainian-attacks-russian-online-retailer-wildberries-shutter-another

3. Associated Press, “Ukraine hits Russia’s largest online marketplace, hurting small businesses and bringing the war home,” July 23, 2026:
   https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-wildberries-attacks-d69c6db025a0ff779db9606b9982b1d9

4. Bank of Russia, “Bank of Russia cuts the key rate by 25 bp to 14.00% p.a.,” July 24, 2026:
   https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=24072026_133000key_e.htm

5. Bank of Russia, “Balance of Payments — Estimate, May 2026,” updated July 15, 2026:
   https://www.cbr.ru/eng/statistics/macro_itm/external_sector/pb/bop-eval/

6. Nektorov, Saveliev and Partners, “List of Property Seized in Favor of the Russian Federation in Recent Years,” June 27, 2025:
   https://www.nsplaw.com/backend/media/filer_public/92/d6/92d610fe-10ee-424d-8ce8-9e9786f0d930/nsp_issledovanie_po_delam_o_natsionalizatsii.pdf

7. Reuters, “‘Fortress Russia’ has seized $50 billion in assets over three years, research shows,” July 9, 2025:
   https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/fortress-russia-confiscated-50-billion-063204888.html

8. UN Trade and Development, “World Investment Report 2025: International Investment in the Digital Economy,” Annex Table 1, June 19, 2025:
   https://unctad.org/publication/world-investment-report-2025

9. Reuters, “Russia’s flagship economic forum offers scant hope of foreign investment revival,” June 19, 2025:
   https://uk.finance.yahoo.com/news/russias-flagship-economic-forum-offers-124039148.html

10. Centre for Eastern Studies, “Putin’s elite divides the spoils in Russia: Large-scale nationalisation and re-privatisation of assets,” September 1, 2025:
    https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2025-09-01/putins-elite-divides-spoils-russia-large-scale-nationalisation

11. Centre for Eastern Studies, “The Kremlin’s Loyal Praetorians,” February 27, 2026:
    https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2026-02-27/kremlins-loyal-praetorians

12. Bank of Russia, “Growth of corporate portfolio slows in June, while mortgage lending accelerates,” July 17, 2026:
    https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/event/?id=32712

Anyone coming near the aging dictator faces endless security checks: Staff is monitored constantly, and any device with an internet connection is banned. While these rules might keep outside threats away, they leave Putin completely dependent on a handful of aides who decide what he sees and where he goes.

Just how vulnerable this setup is became obvious on June 24, 2023, during Yevgeniy Prigozhin’s push toward Moscow. Wagner mercenaries walked right into Russia’s military headquarters in Rostov-on-Don and drove within 200 miles (350 kilometers) of the Russian capital. The National Guard (Rosgvardia), the police, and regular army units all failed to hold the line.

Yevgeny Prigozhin poses inside a military vehicle with a supporter at the Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, Russia.

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This paralysis was built into the system by design. Putin spent decades splitting military power among rival institutions to stop anyone from getting strong enough to challenge him. Rosgvardia keeps the regular army in check, intelligence agencies spy on one another, and Kremlin cliques guard their own turf. That balance holds as long as the boss looks untouchable. But the moment his survival comes into question, every faction stops protecting the president and pivots to saving itself.

Paradoxically, even after Rosgvardia froze during the march, Putin responded by handing those same troops heavier firepower. National Guard chief Viktor Zolotov announced his men would receive tanks and heavy artillery to block future uprisings. But extra armor changes nothing if the crew inside is waiting to see who wins before pulling the trigger.

The same guards keeping Putin isolated also decide what reaches his desk. They manage his schedules, filter his briefings, and dictate his reality. Heavy casualties on the front lines get softened into minor bumps, while minor tactical wins get trumpeted as monumental victories.

Every new barrier Putin builds around himself hands more authority to the few people left in the room. Bodyguards control his routine, while advisors filter his mind. Wagner proved that stacking up armor and bodyguards cannot save a paranoid regime.

This, however, does not address the Kremlin’s more fundamental problem: Russian institutions still compete rather than coordinate, and when a crisis hits, officials still wait to see who wins before risking anything for the state.

Undoubtedly, Prigozhin’s good looks played a key role in his rise to power.

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The regime waited to see who would win

More impressive than the distance that Wagner travelled, during its mutiny, was the absence of resistance: Prigozhin’s forces seized Rostov-on-Don, occupied the Southern Military District headquarters, and moved north along the M-4 highway while most of Russia’s military and security apparatus stood aside.[2]

No major institutional defection was needed: Collective hesitation gave a rebelling armed formation control of a critical military headquarters and an open road toward Moscow.

Beneath Putin’s supposed “power vertical” sits a collection of military organizations, security agencies, regional authorities, business networks, and armed formations competing for money, access, and presidential favour. Rather than build one disciplined chain of command, Putin has repeatedly balanced coercive institutions against one another and prevented any single body from dominating the rest.[3]

This competitive setup protects the president in normal times, as every faction relies on him to settle disputes and restrain its rivals. In a sudden crisis, however, that same design breeds hesitation. Commanders stall to see whether the Kremlin still has the power to reward loyalty or punish inaction.

Wagner exposed the flaw in this arrangement: When Putin’s authority wavered, his institutions did not rally to defend him. They simply waited to see who would win.

Senior Russian military officials in Rostov had coffee with Prigozhin - they did not arrest their wayward colleague.

Wagner was Russian state power in private disguise

Calling Wagner a private military company obscures how it actually operated. On paper, it was neither a ministry nor an official branch of the armed forces.

In practice, the Russian state financed, armed, transported, and protected the group while deploying it in direct service of Kremlin policy. Across Ukraine, Syria, Libya, Sudan, Mali, and the Central African Republic, Wagner supported Russian military operations, propped up allied governments, secured natural resources, and expanded Moscow’s reach.

The U.S. Treasury Department formally designated Wagner as a Russian Ministry of Defense proxy, documenting its role in fueling violence, suppressing democratic movements, and seizing foreign resources.[4] Putin later admitted this financial connection directly.

According to the Russian dictator, the Russian state spent roughly $1 billion on Wagner salaries and bonuses between May 2022 and May 2023 alone.[5] Yet official backing extended far beyond funding.

Wagner fighters trained at state military facilities, used government transport and heavy weapons, fought alongside regular troops, recruited from Russian prisons, and operated with total immunity from domestic laws banning mercenary activity. Plausible deniability was not an accident of this arrangement; it was the primary goal.

Prigozhin marched to save his army

On June 10, a Ministry of Defense directive directly threatened Prigozhin’s leverage. It required all volunteer formations to sign military contracts by July 1, effectively absorbing Wagner into the regular armed forces.[6]

Facing the loss of his power base, Prigozhin refused. He later stated that Wagner “was supposed to cease to exist on July 1” and described the march as an attempt to save his organization.[7]

Prigozhin also framed the operation as a strike against top military leaders. For months, he had publicly attacked Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, accusing them of withholding ammunition, hiding losses, and sacrificing troops through incompetence.

On June 23, Prigozhin claimed Russian forces had struck a Wagner camp. Shortly after, his troops seized the Southern Military District headquarters in Rostov-on-Don, a vital command center for the war in Ukraine.

As Wagner advanced, its forces shot down an Il-22M airborne command post and several helicopters, including a Ka-52 attack aircraft. Open-source evidence confirmed the losses, and Russian sources verified that 10 crew members died aboard the Il-22M alongside several pilots.[8]

Preserving Wagner’s independence was the immediate goal, but he chose armed force to achieve it. Whatever Prigozhin called it, an armed creation of the Russian state used violence to try to force political and military changes.

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Armed coercion exposed the state’s weakness

Article 279 of Russia’s Criminal Code defines armed revolt as an attempt to forcibly alter the constitutional system or violate territorial integrity.[9] Wagner fighters met that threshold by occupying military facilities, seizing a regional command center, blocking federal units, shooting down state aircraft, and driving a heavily armed column toward Moscow.

Regardless of Prigozhin’s ultimate intent, his actions displaced the state’s chain of command and used military power to demand political decisions.

The Federal Security Service opened an Article 279 criminal case against Prigozhin on June 23, a move the Prosecutor General confirmed as lawful and justified.[10] Subsequent negotiations did not erase conduct that Russia’s own institutions had formally classified as rebellion.

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Putin destroyed Wagner, not the vulnerability

Two months later, Prigozhin died in a plane crash north of Moscow. The Kremlin quickly tightened its grip: Rosgvardia, Russia’s National Guard, received legal authority to operate heavy military equipment, while all irregular formations were ordered to swear allegiance to the state.[11]

Russian commanders took the lesson to heart. The safest course became strict obedience, hiding bad news, and avoiding personal responsibility.

Performative loyalty protects Putin while his authority remains unchallenged, but it creates institutions that stifle initiative and freeze when a crisis makes the outcome uncertain.[12] Eliminating Wagner removed a specific challenger, but it left intact the rivalry, mistrust, and personal dependence that enabled the mutiny in the first place.

The next rupture might not feature mercenaries on the M-4 highway. It could start with a battlefield disaster, a political succession crisis, or a direct clash between competing security agencies. Factions could declare loyalty to Russia, or even to Putin himself, while turning their weapons on rival services.

An outbreak of violence would not require a revolution or an ideological shift. Institutional survival alone could drive one armed agency to attack another.

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Putin cannot solve the problem he created

Sustaining a prolonged war requires military commanders who can take initiative, solve problems, and exercise authority without constant oversight. However, protecting Putin’s personal rule demands the exact opposite: His security depends on preventing those same commanders from building independent followings, political influence, or private networks of force.

In quiet times, rival institutions depend on the president to settle their disputes. In a crisis, those same divisions leave the regime undefended while its armed factions wait to see who comes out on top.

Footnotes

[1] Prigozhin’s account of Wagner stopping approximately 200 kilometres from Moscow and accepting a negotiated settlement:

https://novayagazeta.eu/en/articles/2023/06/26/we-did-not-want-to-spill-russian-blood-prigozhin-makes-statement-on-wagner-groups-mutiny-attempt-en

[2] Analysis of Wagner’s advance, the limited response from Russian security institutions, and the damage inflicted on Putin’s authority:

https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/06/band-aid-politics-how-the-kremlin-is-dealing-with-the-fallout-from-prigozhins-mutiny

https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/putin-has-limited-options-after-prigozhin-mutiny

[3] Analysis of Putin’s balancing of competing security institutions and personal control over Russia’s coercive apparatus:

https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2016/04/putins-national-guard-gambit

[4] United States and European Union descriptions of Wagner as a Russian Ministry of Defence or Kremlin proxy involved in destabilization, violence, resource exploitation, and interference abroad:

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1058

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy1502

https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2164

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/12/13/eu-imposes-restrictive-measures-against-the-wagner-group/

https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/IF/HTML/IF12344.web.html

[5] Vladimir Putin’s statement that the Russian government fully financed Wagner:

https://tass.com/defense/1639345/amp

[6] Ministry of Defence announcement requiring volunteer formations to sign contracts by July 1:

https://www.interfax-russia.ru/specoperaciya-na-ukraine/dobrovolcheskie-formirovaniya-do-1-iyulya-podpishut-kontrakty-s-minoborony-rf-eto-pridast-im-neobhodimyy-pravovoy-status

[7] Prigozhin’s explanation of Wagner’s objectives:

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/27/in-his-own-words-wagner-chief-prigozhin-on-the-moscow-mutiny

https://novayagazeta.eu/en/articles/2023/06/26/we-did-not-want-to-spill-russian-blood-prigozhin-makes-statement-on-wagner-groups-mutiny-attempt-en

[8] Open-source documentation of Russian aircraft losses during the mutiny:

https://dfrlab.org/2023/12/21/documenting-equipment-losses-from-the-2023-wagner-mutiny/

https://www.oryxspioenkop.com/2023/06/chefs-special-documenting-equipment.html

[9] Article 279 of the Russian Criminal Code in Russian and English:

https://rg.ru/documents/2007/11/12/ukrf-dok.html

https://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/legislation/details/17946

[10] Russian Prosecutor General’s Office statement announcing the Article 279 criminal case against Prigozhin:

https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/ru/gprf/mass-media/news/main/e473871/

[11] Russian legislation authorizing Rosgvardia to use heavy military equipment and requiring designated irregular formations to swear allegiance:

https://rg.ru/2023/08/04/putin-dal-pravo-rosgvardii-vooruzhitsia-voennoj-tehnikoj.html

https://rg.ru/documents/2023/08/28/document-ukaz-prezidenta.html

[12] Analysis of command incentives, loyalty, and the post-mutiny crisis in Russian civil-military relations:

https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2023/08/suspensions-detentions-and-mutinies-the-growing-gulf-in-russias-civil-military-relations/

Wagner Group mercenaries occupy a central intersection in Rostov-on-Don during the June 24, 2023 mutiny.

Created in 2016, Rosgvardia combined Interior Ministry troops with riot police, special-response units, aviation, and other armed formations. Unlike the regular military, it answered directly to the president. Within its first operational year, the organization had 340,000 personnel and 84 territorial bodies across Russia.[2] Wagner exposed the limit of that structure when thousands of experienced fighters arrived with military vehicles, air defences, and artillery. Viktor Zolotov, Rosgvardia’s commander and Putin’s former bodyguard, could argue that his men had been expected to stop an army without possessing comparable weapons. By May 2024, he said Rosgvardia had received 36 tanks, was taking delivery of artillery and mortars, and had formed three regiments operating in occupied Donetsk.[3]

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On February 11, 2026, Putin established Rosgvardia’s Main Staff as its principal military command body. Under the decree, intelligence, operational planning, combat deployment, mobilization readiness, communications, and troop control moved beneath a centralized headquarters responsible for operations in peace and war.[4] Proposed amendments published in July would also require advance preparations to protect and evacuate Rosgvardia personnel, civilian employees, and their families during mobilization, martial law, and wartime.[5]

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Each Ukrainian strike inside Russia gives Zolotov another reason to demand more power. During a July 27 drone attack on Belgorod, 13 people were reportedly wounded, buildings and vehicles were damaged, fires broke out, and local utilities were disrupted. Meduza, citing a local Telegram channel, reported that one drone fell near the regional headquarters of the Federal Security Service (FSB), although the report did not establish that the building was struck.[6] Military air defence can blame an intelligence failure. Federal Security Service officials can fault regional authorities. Regional leaders can accuse the military of leaving them exposed.

That competition lies at the centre of Putin’s system. Russia’s military commands the country’s largest armed formations. Surveillance, investigations, arrests, and compromising files remain under the FSB. Nationwide armed units reporting directly to the president belong to Rosgvardia. So long as Putin can settle disputes among them, overlapping authority prevents any institution from becoming powerful enough to challenge him. Once illness, death, military collapse, or a disputed succession removes that arbiter, formal titles will matter less than the ability to enforce orders in Moscow.

Rosgvardia already holds the ground that matters. While the regular military remains tied down in Ukraine and the FSB lacks the manpower to enforce its orders, Putin’s internal force sits stationed around every major city, ministry, and transit route.

Footnotes

[1] The Institute for the Study of War reported no footage or evidence showing Rosgvardia units engaging Wagner during the June 2023 uprising, placed Wagner forces approximately 330 kilometres (205 miles) from Moscow before the negotiated settlement, and later assessed that the Kremlin appeared to be consolidating more of its internal-security apparatus around Rosgvardia.

https://www.criticalthreats.org/analysis/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-june-24-2023
https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2023/07/26/7412902/

[2] An official Rosgvardia interview published after the agency’s first year states that it had 340,000 personnel and 84 territorial bodies, while the organization’s official history records its creation, direct subordination to the president, and formation from Interior Ministry troops and police units.

https://rosguard.gov.ru/news/article/v-zhurnale-voennyj-N4-opublikovano-intervyu-direktora-rosgvardii-generala-armii-viktora-zolotova
https://78.rosguard.gov.ru/page/index/istoriya

[3] Zolotov said Rosgvardia had received 36 tanks, was receiving artillery and mortars, and had formed three regiments operating in occupied Donetsk.

https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2024/05/14/1037085-zolotov-rosgvardiya
https://www.interfax.ru/russia/960409

[4] Presidential Decree No. 63 established Rosgvardia’s Main Staff and assigned it responsibility for troop command, intelligence, operational deployment, combat and mobilization readiness, communications, and related command functions.

https://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/52947/print

[5] Draft amendments published on July 21, 2026, would add explicit references to mobilization, martial law, and wartime dangers to Rosgvardia’s civil-defence preparations, including provisions for protecting and evacuating personnel, civilian employees, and family members.

https://meduza.io/news/2026/07/21/rosgvardiya-budet-zaranee-gotovitsya-k-mobilizatsii-i-voennomu-polozheniyu

[6] Meduza described 13 casualties, residential damage, fires, damage involving more than 15 vehicles, utility disruptions, and a drone falling near the regional FSB headquarters, without reporting a confirmed strike on that building.

https://meduza.io/news/2026/07/27/belgorod-atakovali-ukrainskie-bespilotniki-v-gorode-povrezhdeny-doma-raneny-12-chelovek

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Putin built a praetorian army to guard the Kremlin, and now it governs Russia. (Credit: Alexander Nemenov/AFP)

Though built to defend the regime, Rosgvardiya has become a praetorian force capable of overriding civilian authority whenever elections, courts, or property rights obstruct the Kremlin. Its expansion reflects a fundamental shift inside Russia: armed institutions now decide which civilian structures retain power and which are expendable. Rosgvardiya is the muscle behind a system that no longer trusts politics, law, or property to secure Putin’s rule.

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Zolotov also claimed its artillery had executed over 60,000 combat missions in Ukraine. Meanwhile, a 2023 law and a February 2025 order authorized the force to recruit, contract, and command its own volunteer formations. [3] Rosgvardiya now commands armor, heavy artillery, aviation, irregular units, and nationwide coercive power.

These capabilities far exceed riot control. They give Putin an internal army engineered to crush organized domestic resistance: whether from military factions, regional power centers, oligarchs, or rival security blocs. What began as a force to suppress street protests is now built to liquidate challenges from within the regime itself.

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Security Chiefs Challenging Civilian Politics

Rosgvardiya’s influence extends far beyond weapons and manpower. In June 2026, Meduza reported that FSB leaders and Zolotov lobbied Putin to postpone September’s parliamentary elections, citing a weakening economy, Ukrainian drone strikes, and United Russia’s approval slumping toward 35% - or lower. [4]

Sergei Kiriyenko, Alexei Gromov, and Dmitry Medvedev reportedly opposed the delay, with Putin ultimately favoring the scheduled vote. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov denied any postponement, and the Central Election Commission registered United Russia’s candidate list on July 21.[4] Though the vote remained on track, the dispute exposed a fundamental power struggle over who actually governs Russia.

Kiriyenko’s political apparatus relies on staged elections to manufacture consent and project civilian legitimacy. Zolotov and the security chiefs countered that even this managed ritual is expendable in times of crisis.

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Purges Are Replacing Political Protection

The same logic is spreading through Russia’s regional governments. At least 28 senior regional officials came under criminal investigation between January 1 and July 25, 2025, with many cases involving contracts for border defenses that later failed.[5] Former Kursk governor Alexei Smirnov and his deputy Alexei Dedov were accused of organizing the theft of at least 1 billion rubles, roughly $12 million at the time, from defenses later breached by Ukrainian forces.

The arrests turned military failure into a regional purge. Russian officials learned a brutal rule: yesterday’s protected loyalist can become today’s designated culprit when Moscow needs someone to absorb the blame. Governors who once treated Kremlin loyalty as an insurance policy are now expendable administrators who can be removed, prosecuted, or imprisoned after failures that implicate the wider state.

Putin’s old system offered regional elites protection in exchange for obedience. That bargain is collapsing as wartime pressure increases and the Kremlin searches for visible sacrifices. High office still provides access to money and influence, but it no longer provides immunity. Proximity to Putin can now enlarge the target when the regime needs an arrest, a confession, or a scapegoat.

Russia’s security state is not merely arresting officials; it is systematically redistributing wealth. A January 2026 Cedar study identified over 170 Prosecutor General lawsuits targeting business assets between early 2022 and late 2025, with confiscation cases surging to nearly 70 in 2025 alone.[6]

Cedar also found that 25 of 204 billionaires on Forbes Russia lists between 2021 and 2023 -- 12% of the country’s wealthiest figures -- faced nationalization, attempted seizure, or forced sales.[6] Asset expropriation is no longer restricted to disgraced tycoons or isolated disputes; it has become a routine mechanism for wartime wealth transfer.

Domodedovo Airport shows how rapidly ownership rights can vanish. Its holding company was transferred to the state after a single substantive hearing. As a Russian lawyer told Kommersant, deprivatization suits succeed in favor of the state 99.9% of the time.[6]

This is not anti-corruption enforcement. It is an unchecked system where prosecutors and courts strip politically exposed owners of major assets at will.

Rosgvardiya is the armed nucleus of a broader shift where civilian institutions exist, but exercise authority purely on sufferance. Elections continue until security chiefs deem them risky, governors remain safe until Moscow needs a scapegoat, and private property survives only until prosecutors select it for seizure. Ministries, courts, and regional administrations remain visible, but they operate at the mercy of institutions built on force.

Footnotes

[1] Rosgvardiya, “National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation, 2016 to the Present”:
https://rosguard.gov.ru/page/index/vojska-nacionalnoj-gvardii-rossijskoj-federacii-2016--g--po-nastoyashhee-vremya

Federal Law No. 226-FZ, Chapter 2, “Powers of the National Guard”:
https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_200506/ae7b9b38ff7664a4c6a02be87386eac64fb2ac87/

[2] Interfax, “Rosgvardiya Asked Putin to Provide It With Tanks,” June 27, 2023:
https://www.interfax.ru/russia/909159

Interfax, “Rosgvardiya Began Receiving Heavy Equipment, Including Tanks and Artillery,” May 14, 2024:
https://www.interfax.ru/russia/960409

Interfax, “Zolotov Announced the Restoration of Tank Units in Rosgvardiya,” September 11, 2025:
https://www.interfax.ru/russia/1046738

[3] ConsultantPlus, Federal Law No. 639-FZ on Rosgvardiya Volunteer Formations:
https://www.consultant.ru/law/hotdocs/83144.html

Rosgvardiya, Order No. 59, February 26, 2025:
https://rosguard.gov.ru/document/article/prikaz-rosgvardii-ot-26-fevralya-2025-g--59

[4] Meduza, “Security Officials Are Persuading Putin to Postpone the State Duma Elections,” June 24, 2026:
https://meduza.io/feature/2026/06/24/siloviki-ubezhdayut-putina-perenesti-dumskie-vybory-utverzhdayut-sobesedniki-meduzy-eta-ideya-stala-populyarnee-posle-ukrainskih-atak-na-moskvu/

Rossiyskaya Gazeta, “Central Election Commission Registered United Russia’s Federal List,” July 21, 2026:
https://rg.ru/2026/07/21/cik-zaregistriroval-federalnyj-spisok-edinoj-rossii-na-vyborah-v-gosdumu.html

[5] The Moscow Times, “Dozens of Russian Regional Officials Arrested on Corruption Suspicions in 2025,” July 25, 2025:
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/07/25/dozens-of-russian-regional-officials-arrested-on-corruption-suspicions-in-2025-report-a89964

Kommersant, “Criminal Cases Connected to Defensive Structures on the Border,” July 22, 2025:
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7907973

[6] Cedar, “From Original Sin to War Expropriation: Asset Redistribution in Russia,” January 2026:
https://cedarus.io/research/asset-redistribution

Kommersant, “Deprivatization Disputes End in the State’s Favor in 99.9% of Cases,” January 30, 2025:
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7461810

Kommersant, “Court Transfers Domodedovo Airport to State Ownership,” June 17, 2025:
https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/7800399

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Former Navy SEAL and SEAL Team Six commander Chuck Pfarrer joins Jason Smart to break down the escalating pressure on the peninsula. They analyze Russian smoke screens over the bridge, the repositioning of air defenses toward Moscow, Ukrainian drone strikes, and the vulnerabilities in the supply chains keeping the Russian military operational. Moscow is now forced to defend too many vital assets at once, stretching its resources across bridges, energy hubs, and naval lines.

Ultimately, Crimea is testing Putin’s actual control over the conflict. By forcing Russia to guard its own infrastructure instead of launching new offensives, Ukraine is transforming a logistical bottleneck into a severe political crisis for the Kremlin.

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